SENSITIVE INFORMATION

Security Assessment Report

Torrey Pines Facility

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17773 South Grand Ave.
San Rafael, CA, 91194

Assessment Date: September 16, 2022
Presented by:
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BACKGROUND

Scope

On Sep. 16, 2022, Secure Core LLC, conducted a Security assessment at Torrey Pines Facility located at the following address: 17773 South Grand Ave., San Rafael, CA, 91194. Based on the visual inspection conducted of the facility, surrounding property, general utilities and infrastructure, this security assessment serves to identify critical physical and procedural vulnerabilities to provide stakeholders with common mitigation solutions for consideration. The primary focus of this report is on physical security and crime prevention through environmental design. Although this report references elements regarding building safety, ADA compliance or fire hazard prevention, it is beyond the scope of this report and should be addressed respectively. The observations made by the assessor and presented in this report are based on industry standard references, best practices, acquired knowledge and the assessor's professional experience in efforts to tailor the suggested mitigation options to the physical and operational needs of the facility. Solutions for consideration listed within the report do not necessarily include every option available, but rather present some of the most common options employ

Disclaimer

Any action taken by a recipient of this report or by his/her representatives based upon this security assessment does not guarantee nor warrant in any way whatsoever that the assessed location/s, facility, its users or visitors may or may not be rendered safer, invulnerable or in any fashion impervious to successful penetration, attack or other act which could cause property damage and/or personal injury to the facility or its patrons.
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STATIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS

Data Summary

Intelligence	Assessor's Evaluation
Rate the crime level based on local data and statistics.*89%*	Very High
Rate the level of hostility from the neighboring populace toward the asset or organization.*60 %*	Very Low
Rate the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring in which the facility is targeted.	Very Low
Rate the likelihood of an aerial chemical or gas spill occurring near the facility.*not*	Very Low
Rate the likelihood of an attack involving small arms or explosives against the asset or in the surrounding area.	Very Low
Rate the assessed adversarial capabilities as they apply to the asset.*15*	Very High
Rate the frequency of past security-related incidents affecting the asset, organization, similar, or neighboring facility.*60%*	Low
Rate the level of current threats against the facility.	Low
Rate the likelihood of a natural disaster significantly impacting the facility.	Very Low

Environment	Assessor's Evaluation
What is the asset's proximity to other buildings, facilities, main thoroughfares, or highways?*less than a mile*	Very Close
What is the asset's proximity to high-level or sensitive targets in the area?*700 miles*	Very Far
What is the asset's proximity to possible hazardous/dangerous infrastructure or materials?*25 miles *	Very Far
What is the asset's proximity to the nearest law enforcement station?*50 miles*	Very Far
What is the asset's proximity to the nearest fire station/medical facility?*70 miles*	Very Far
What is the asset's proximity to the nearest armed security force?*2 miles*	Very Close

QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS

Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS)

The Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS) renders a quantitative numeric ranking on the scale of 1-100, based on vulnerabilities identified and the asset's unique environmental and circumstantial factors. The higher the score, the safer the asset is.The AVRS provides a tool to compare diverse asset variants based on unique risks identified for each. Additionally, the tool facilitates understanding risk conditions, enabling objective cross-facility comparative analysis while incorporating structural, environmental, and circumstantial variables.The AVRS incorporates documented vulnerabilities with the assessor's chosen risk level and mitigation priorities. Additionally, the numeric result considers each security layer's importance as it pertains to the overall protection of the asset and assessment of the environmental variables, including facility type, history, operations, and current threats in the context of the real-time environment.

Definitions

Minor Risk	88-100	Based on analysis of the asset type, size, and sensitivity as it applies to both human and environmental threats, the asset is at minor risk, receiving a well above-average Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS). Few vulnerabilities were identified, which may require mitigation to enhance security.
Low Risk	76-87	Based on analysis of the asset type, size, and sensitivity as it applies to both human and environmental threats, the asset is at low risk, receiving a slightly above-average Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS). Some vulnerabilities were identified, which require immediate attention to enhance security.
Medium/Average Risk	55-75	Based on analysis of the asset type, size, and sensitivity as it applies to both human and environmental threats, the asset is at medium risk, receiving an average Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS). Some significant vulnerabilities were identified, which require immediate attention to enhance security.

High Risk	40-54	Based on analysis of the asset type, size, and sensitivity as it applies to both human and environmental threats, the asset is at high risk, receiving a below-average Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS). Consequential vulnerabilities were identified in areas significant to asset security. Immediate collaborative efforts are required to improve the asset's security posture.
Critical Risk	0-39	Based on analysis of the asset type, size, and sensitivity as it applies to both human and environmental threats, the asset is at critical risk, receiving a well below-average Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS). Consequential vulnerabilities were identified in various areas significant to asset security. Urgent collaborative efforts are required to improve the asset's security posture.

RISK LEVEL	SECTION	AREA	VULNERABILITY	PRIORITY
Critical	Equipment	Fire Alarm	Deficient Fire Alarm System	Mitigate A
	Equipment	Fire Alarm	Deficient Carbon Dioxide Detector(s)	Mitigate A
	Perimeter	Parking Lot	Insufficient Access Control	Mitigate A
	Interior	Cafeteria	Insufficient Security Camera Monitoring Capabilities	Mitigate A
High	Perimeter	Balcony	Security Camera Coverage	Mitigate A
	Perimeter	Balcony	Easily Scalable	Mitigate A
	Perimeter	Staff Parking	Insufficient Access Control	Mitigate B
	Interior	Emergency Exit	Insufficient Emergency Signage	Mitigate B
	Interior	Elevator	Unmaintained Condition	Mitigate B
	Interior	Bathroom	Insufficient Emergency Lighting	Mitigate B
	Equipment	Backup Power	Deficient Equipment	Mitigate B
	Procedures	Earthquake Emergency Plan	Insufficient Emergency Procedures	Mitigate B
	Personnel	Security Coordinator	Undesignated Security Coordinator	Mitigate B
	COVID-19/Pandemic	Symptom Screening	Unestablished Symptom Identification Requirement Plan	Mitigate B
Medium	Perimeter	Building Frontage	Lighting	Mitigate B
	Perimeter	Building Frontage Copy	Excessive Access Points	Mitigate B
	Perimeter	Yard	Enables Surveillance	Mitigate C
	Perimeter	Façade	Insufficient Signage	Mitigate A
	Interior	Cafeteria	Unprotected Glass	Mitigate C

RISK LEVEL	SECTION	AREA	VULNERABILITY	PRIORITY
	Equipment	First Aid Kit	Insufficient Medical Supply	Mitigate C
	Equipment	Lock Box/Knox Box	Deficient Emergency Equipment	Mitigate C
	Personnel	Personnel Background Checks	Insufficient Background Checks	Mitigate C
	Personnel	Parking Attendants	Insufficient Training	Mitigate C
Low	Perimeter	Building Frontage	Excessive Access Points	Transfer
	Perimeter	Parking Lot	Identifiable Parking Spots	Transfer
	Perimeter	Water Main	Deficient Backflow Device	Transfer
	Interior	Library	Seismic Safety	Accept
	Procedures	Security Guards	Insufficient Guard Auditing Procedures	Transfer
	Personnel	Parking Attendants	Insufficient Traffic Safety Attire	Transfer
Minor	Equipment	Walk-Through Metal Detector	Deficient Equipment	Mitigate C
	Equipment	Intercom System	Insufficient Communication Equipment	Accept
	Procedures	Guest List	Insufficient Access Control Procedures	Transfer
	COVID-19/Pandemic	Facility Capacity	Unestablished Capacity Guidelines	Accept
	Perimeter	Roof	Insufficient Security Camera Coverage	Mitigate C
	Interior	Emergency Exit	Inward Swinging Door	Transfer

Risk Severity by Section



Perimeter

Balcony

MA H

Vulnerability: Security Camera Coverage

Activity around the perimeter balcony is not monitored by a security camera system. The ability to detect and respond to an incident may be delayed, thus exposing facility assets to risk. Limited security cameras reduce deterrence effects, may encourage unlawful activity in unsupervised areas, and hinder the ability to conduct a proper post-incident investigation.There are no cameras on any of the balconies where employees eat lunch and have meetings.

Solutions

- **Camera Repair/Replacement**
  Repair/replace existing security camera/s around the balcony to facilitate continuous monitoring. Sufficient security camera coverage may substitute the need for frequent patrols in the area. For increased deterrence, install cameras in overt locations, strategically placed to avoid vandalism, sabotage, or environmental damage. Ensure faces of personnel within the frame can be identified. Motion activated security camera sensors may also be used to prioritize monitoring efforts.
  Reference: ASIS-Physical Security, P. 103, FEMA 426, 4-21, 5-44

- **Security Camera Installation**
  Install security camera/s around the perimeter balcony to monitor surrounding activity. Sufficient security camera coverage may substitute the need for frequent patrols in the area. Cameras installed should function in all lighting and weather

conditions, day and night. For increased deterrence, install cameras in overt locations, strategically placed to avoid vandalism, sabotage, or environmental damage. Motion activated security camera sensors may also be used, recording only when activity is detected.

Reference: ASIS-Physical Security, P. 103, FEMA 426,4-21, 5-44

- **Security Signage**

  Post security signage on and around the balcony to deter unauthorized personnel and unlawful activity in the area. Include wording such as, "No Trespassing," "Private Property," or "Under CCTV Surveillance." As a deterrent, proper signage can advise personnel of security systems and administrative regulations exercised on the property. Signage should be concise, legible from a distance, well lit, and printed in all relevant languages.

Building Frontage

MB Md **Vulnerability: Lighting**

Insufficient lighting along the building frontage may increase the risk of accidental injury and promote criminal or vagrant activity in the area. Inadequate lighting may render existing surveillance equipment ineffective creating gaps in the facility's monitoring ability. Additionally, limited lighting along the building frontage

mayPoor lighting that is a safety hazard to employees and individuals walking up to the main entrance especially at night you cant see the 10 feet in front of you. impact access control procedures.

Solutions

- **Continuous Lighting**
  Install continuous lighting along the building frontage. Proper continuous lighting requires a series of fixed overlapping cones of light providing constant illumination in low light conditions and during hours of darkness.
  Reference: FEMA 426, 2-67, 2-68

- **Standby Lighting**
  Install standby lighting along the building frontage. Standby lighting activates when motion is detected by the sensor, providing deterrence and exposure.
  Reference: FEMA 426, 2-68

Tr L

Vulnerability: Excessive Access Points

There are multiple access points along the building frontage providing access to the facility. An excess number of access points can make the facility more susceptible to unauthorized entry. Multiple access points are difficult to monitor and make proper access control challenging. Additionally, efforts to secure the facility in a lockdown may be delayed.

Solutions

- **Access Point Minimization**
  Depending on security resources available, access using entry points along the building frontage should be limited to one single entry point, where visitors can be

Parking Lot

MA C

Vulnerability: Insufficient Access Control

Vehicle and/or pedestrian access to the parking lot is not controlled. Unauthorized vehicles may park illegally, observe, or gain access to the facility. In some cases, unrestricted access to a parking lot may expose the facility and/or personnel to the risk of accidental or deliberate vehicular impact.

Solutions

- **RFID Card Reader**
  Install an RFID card reader at the parking lot entrance, ensuring only authorized personnel equipped with a valid card/FOB are permitted access into the parking area. This system automates the access control process and typically interacts with locking devices which authorize and log entry to the parking area.
  Reference: FEMA 426, 5-19, 5-38, 5-41

MC Md

Vulnerability: Unprotected Glass

The cafeteria design incorporates unprotected glass which may increase the risk of intrusion and limit the ability to thoroughly lockdown the room. In the case of an explosion, extreme weather, or seismic event, glass fragments may cause injury to personnel.

Solutions

- **Glass Protection Film**
  Treat unprotected glass in the cafeteria with shatter resistant, fragment retention, anchored protective security film. Window tinting may be considered for added privacy.
  Reference: FEMA 426, 1-35, 3-73



- **Reinforced Glass**
  Replace unprotected glass in the cafeteria with reinforced glass. Variants include wire-reinforced, heat-strengthened, laminated or polycarbonate.
  Reference: FEMA 426, F-11, 3-71, 3-72

- **Blast Curtains**
  Install blast curtains on the interior of the cafeteria glass. In the event of an explosion, extreme weather, or seismic activity, blast curtains serve to stop glass fragments from flying into occupied spaces.
  Reference: FEMA 426, 3-79

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