#### **SENSITIVE INFORMATION**

# Security Assessment Report

# **Torrey Pines Facility**

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Assessment Date: September 16, 2022
Presented by:
Secure Core LLC

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### **BACKGROUND**

### Scope

On Sep. 16, 2022, Secure Core LLC, conducted a Security assessment at Torrey Pines Facility located at the following address: 17773 South Grand Ave., San Rafael, CA, 91194. Based on the visual inspection conducted of the facility, surrounding property, general utilities and infrastructure, this security assessment serves to identify critical physical and procedural vulnerabilities to provide stakeholders with common mitigation solutions for consideration. The primary focus of this report is on physical security and crime prevention through environmental design. Although this report references elements regarding building safety, ADA compliance or fire hazard prevention, it is beyond the scope of this report and should be addressed respectively. The observations made by the assessor and presented in this report are based on industry standard references, best practices, acquired knowledge and the assessor's professional experience in efforts to tailor the suggested mitigation options to the physical and operational needs of the facility. Solutions for consideration listed within the report do not necessarily include every option available, but rather present some of the most common options employed within the security industry. Unless stated otherwise this security assessment does not include any aspect of IT/ Cyber vulnerabilities which should be assessed independently.

#### **Disclaimer**

Any action taken by a recipient of this report or by his/her representatives based upon this security assessment does not guarantee nor warrant in any way whatsoever that the assessed location/s, facility, its users or visitors may or may not be rendered safer, invulnerable or in any fashion impervious to successful penetration, attack or other act which could cause property damage and/or personal injury to the facility or its patrons.

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## **Executive Summary**

During a Security assessment conducted at 17773 South Grand Ave. San Rafael, CA 91194 on Sep. 16, 2022, the below key vulnerabilities were observed and identified:

**Emergency Exit:** The emergency exit on the second story posed the most significant safety and security risk. The emergency exit door was blocked by debris and boxes, restricting emergency egress. A clear path from common areas to the emergency exist must remain at all times.

**Main Office:** In the case of an active shooter, or if an unauthorized individual gains access to the interior, the main office door cannot be locked quickly from the inside. The door requires the employee to exit the office and lock the door from the exterior. The existing locks (and doors in some cases) require replacement.

**Parking Lot:** The perimeter parking lot is accessible to vehicles and pedestrians. To mitigate loitering and criminal activity, the lot requires a perimeter fence and additional access control measures.

## **Overview: Local Crime**

Crime in Los Angeles has varied throughout time, reaching peaks between the 1970s and 1990s. Since the early 2020s, crime has increased in Los Angeles as well as elsewhere in the United States.

In 2012, the Los Angeles Police Department reported that crime had declined in the city for the 10th consecutive year.[1] In 2013, Los Angeles reported 296 homicides in the city proper, which corresponds to a rate of 6.3 per 100,000 population—a notable decrease from 1980, when the all time homicide rate of 34.2 per 100,000 population was reported for the year.[2]

In 2014, there were 260 homicides, at a rate of 6.7 per 100,000 people.[3]

In 2015, it was revealed that the LAPD had been under-reporting crime for eight years, making the crime rate in the city appear much lower than it really is. Approximately 14,000 assaults went unreported as "minor offenses" rather than violent crimes.[4] Additionally, recent years have seen more crime in the increasingly gentrified downtown area.[5] However, these

inaccuracies do not affect the general downward trend in crime in Los Angeles.[4]

The city is patrolled by the Los Angeles Police Department. California Highway Patrol and Los Angeles County police also assist.

VIOLENT CRIMES	08/14/22 TO	07/17/22 TO	%	07/17/22 TO	06/19/22 TO	%	YTD	YTD	%	YTD	YTD	%
	09/10/22	08/13/22	Change	08/13/22	07/16/22	Change	2022	2021	Change	2022	2020	Change
HOMICIDE	37	38	-2.6%	38	32	18.8%	281	280	0.4%	281	223	26.0%
RAPE (121, 122)	40	58	-31.0%	58	58	0.0%	543	689	-21.2%	543	659	-17.6%
RAPE(815,820,821)	23	34	-32.4%	34	36	-5.6%	387	397	-2.5%	387	451	-14.2%
TOTAL RAPE	63	92	-31.5%	92	94	-2.1%	930	1086	-14.4%	930	1110	-16.2%
ROBBERY	695	764	-9.0%	764	755	1.2%	6588	5594	17.8%	6588	5588	17.9%
AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS	1607	1614	-0.4%	1614	1696	-4.8%	14193	14036	1.1%	14193	12573	12.9%
TOTAL VIOLENT	2402	2508	-4.2%	2508	2577	-2.7%	21992	20996	4.7%	21992	19494	12.8%
PROPERTY CRIMES	08/14/22 TO	07/17/22 TO	%	07/17/22 TO	06/19/22 TO	%	YTD	YTD	%	YTD	YTD	%
	09/10/22	08/13/22	Change	08/13/22	07/16/22	Change	2022	2021	Change	2022	2020	Change
BURGLARY	933	1119	-16.6%	1119	1131	-1.1%	10095	8783	14.9%	10095	9790	3.1%
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT	1861	2039	-8.7%	2039	2013	1.3%	18220	15923	14.4%	18220	14773	23.3%
BTFV	1800	2089	-13.8%	2089	2264	-7.7%	20960	19730	6.2%	20960	19818	5.8%
PERSONAL/OTHER THEFT	1811	2040	-11.2%	2040	2126	-4.0%	19032	16373	16.2%	19032	16956	12.2%
TOTAL PROPERTY	6405	7287	-12.1%	7287	7534	-3.3%	68307	60809	12.3%	68307	61337	11.4%
TOTAL PART I	8807	9795	-10.1%	9795	10111	-3.1%	90299	81805	10.4%	90299	80831	11.7%
Child/Spousal Abuse (Part I & II)*	1188	1156	2.8%	1156	1227	-5.8%	10244	10125	1.2%	10244	10468	-2.1%
SHOTS FIRED	227	237	-4.2%	237	265	-10.6%	2286	2333	-2.0%	2286	1770	29.2%
SHOOTING VICTIMS	109	126	-13.5%	126	110	14.5%	1007	1015	-0.8%	1007	781	28.9%
			DDEST S	TATISTICS for w	ook anding 00	(40/22						_
ARRESTS	08/14/22 TO	07/17/22 TO	%	07/17/22 TO	06/19/22 TO	%	YTD	YTD	%	YTD	YTD	%
HULLOTO	09/10/22	08/13/22	Change	08/13/22	07/16/22	Change	2022	2021	Change	2022	2020	Change
HOMICIDE	29	31	-6.5%	31	32	-3.1%	285	304	-6.3%	285	222	28.4%
RAPE	15	15	0.0%	15	19	-21.1%	175	196	-10.7%	175	185	-5.4%
ROBBERY	192	230	-16.5%	230	163	41.1%	1584	1548	2.3%	1584	1641	-3.5%
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT**	749	671	11.6%	671	691	-2.9%	5926	6317	-6.2%	5926	6036	-1.8%
BURGLARY	111	136	-18.4%	136	132	3.0%	1152	1277	-9.8%	1152	1689	-31.8%
	173	143	21.0%	143	167	-14.4%	1351	1123	20.3%	1351	1740	-22.4%
LARCENY												
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT	261	297	-12.1%	297	276	7.6%	2532	2683	-5.6%	2532	2431	4.2%
		297 947	-12.1% 4.0%	297 947	276 905	7.6% 4.6%	2532 7970	2683 8365	-5.6% -4.7%	2532 7970	2431 8084	-1.4%
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT	261		-									

## **STATIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS**

## **Data Summary**

Intelligence	Assessor's Evaluation
Rate the crime level based on local data and statistics.	Medium
Rate the level of hostility from the neighboring populace toward the asset or organization.	Very Low
Rate the likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring in which the facility is targeted.	Very Low
Rate the likelihood of an aerial chemical or gas spill occurring near the facility.	Very Low
Rate the likelihood of an attack involving small arms or explosives against the asset or in the surrounding area.	Very Low
Rate the assessed adversarial capabilities as they apply to the asset.	Low
Rate the frequency of past security-related incidents affecting the asset, organization, similar, or neighboring facility.	Low
Rate the level of current threats against the facility.	Very Low
Rate the likelihood of a natural disaster significantly impacting the facility.	Very Low
Rate the level of regulatory challenges facing the facility if implementing security and infrastructural improvements/changes.	Medium

Environment	Assessor's Evaluation
What is the asset's proximity to other buildings, facilities, main thoroughfares, or highways?	Very Close
What is the asset's proximity to high-level or sensitive targets in the area?	Far
What is the asset's proximity to possible hazardous/dangerous infrastructure or materials?	Very Far
What is the asset's proximity to the nearest law enforcement station?	Medium Range
What is the asset's proximity to the nearest fire station/medical facility?	Medium Range

Environment	Assessor's Evaluation
What is the asset's proximity to the nearest armed security force?	Far


Attractiveness	Assessor's Evaluation
Rate the asset/facility size.	High / Large
Rate the public exposure level of the asset/organization (signage, flags, advertisements, notoriety, etc.)	Low / Small
Rate the online exposure of the asset/organization (social media, websites, online advertisements, etc.)	Low / Small
Rate the level of media coverage regarding the asset/organization (news outlets, online resources, television, radio, etc.)	Very Low / Small
Rate the average numeric quantity of human assets physically located at the facility or location.	Very High / Large
Rate the value and amount of protected physical assets.	Very High / Large
Rate the combined value and amount of sensitive data/commercial or trade secrets stored with the asset.	Low / Small
Rate the assessed reputational damage the facility/organization would incur in the case of a plausible security incident resulting in severe injury or significant financial loss.	Very High / Large

Law Enforcement and Response	Assessor's Evaluation	
How effective is local law enforcement response time?	Usually Effective	
How effective (response time and capability) is local law enforcement when responding to an imminent threat?	Usually Effective	
How effective (response time and capability) is local fire/paramedic response?	Very Effective	
How effective are local and/or regional intelligence and security agencies at detecting and foiling threats?	Usually Effective	
How effective are the local security forces in the area (private security, building security, neighborhood watch, volunteers, etc.)?	Ineffective	
How effective is local neighborhood surveillance equipment currently deployed in the area (security cameras, street cameras, alarm systems, other electronic deterrence systems, etc.)?	Very Ineffective	

Law Enforcement and Response	Assessor's Evaluation
How effective are on-premise security personnel with respect to relevant threats?	Ineffective

## **QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS**

## **Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS)**



The Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS) renders a quantitative numeric ranking on the scale of 1-100, based on vulnerabilities identified and the asset's unique environmental and circumstantial factors. The higher the score, the safer the asset is. The AVRS provides a tool to compare diverse asset variants based on unique risks identified for each. Additionally, the tool facilitates understanding risk conditions, enabling objective cross-facility comparative analysis while incorporating structural, environmental, and circumstantial variables. The AVRS incorporates documented vulnerabilities with the assessor's chosen risk level and mitigation priorities. Additionally, the numeric result considers each security layer's importance as it pertains to the overall protection of the asset and assessment of the environmental variables, including facility type, history, operations, and current threats in the context of the real-time environment.

### **Definitions**

Minor Risk	88-100	Based on analysis of the asset type, size, and sensitivity as it applies to both human and environmental threats, the asset is at minor risk, receiving a well above-average Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS). Few vulnerabilities were identified, which may require mitigation to enhance security.
Low Risk	76-87	Based on analysis of the asset type, size, and sensitivity as it applies to both human and environmental threats, the asset is at low risk, receiving a slightly above-average Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS). Some vulnerabilities were identified, which require immediate attention to enhance security.
Medium/Av erage Risk	55-75	Based on analysis of the asset type, size, and sensitivity as it applies to both human and environmental threats, the asset is at medium risk, receiving an average Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS). Some significant vulnerabilities were identified, which require immediate attention to enhance security.

High Risk	40-54	Based on analysis of the asset type, size, and sensitivity as it applies to both human and environmental threats, the asset is at high risk, receiving a below-average Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS). Consequential vulnerabilities were identified in areas significant to asset security. Immediate collaborative efforts are required to improve the asset's security posture.
Critical Risk	0-39	Based on analysis of the asset type, size, and sensitivity as it applies to both human and environmental threats, the asset is at critical risk, receiving a well below-average Asset Vulnerability Risk Score (AVRS). Consequential vulnerabilities were identified in various areas significant to asset security. Urgent collaborative efforts are required to improve the asset's security posture.

## **Risk Analysis and Prioritization**

The information in this section summarizes the risk level analysis determined for each vulnerability identified. The risk level was established based on professional experience and deep analysis of the threat vectors derived from the vulnerability identified, current intelligence and past incidents, probability of occurrence and the potential impact to facility structure, personnel, reputation, and operational sustainability if a vulnerability is exploited in full. Risk level definitions were set as follows:

#### Minor (M)

There is a very low probability of an incident occurring in which the identified vulnerability is exploited. While similar or comparable incidents may or may not have occurred in the past, there is no current evidence suggesting an imminent threat. If an incident were to take place, it may result in minor cost and/or damage to assets in addition to the possibility of minor injuries to persons, short-term operational interruption with no reputational damage.

#### Low (L)

There is a low probability of an incident occurring in which the identified vulnerability is exploited. Similar incidents may have occurred in the past, in the region, at comparable facility types, or at a facility with a similar vulnerability. If an incident were to take place, it may result in low cost and/or damage to assets in addition to the possibility of minor injuries to persons, short-term operational interruption with no reputational damage.

#### Medium (Md)

There is a moderate probability of an incident occurring in which the identified vulnerability is exploited. Similar incidents may have occurred in the past, in the region, at comparable facility types, or at a facility with a similar vulnerability. If an incident were to take place, it may result in moderate cost and/or damage to assets in addition to the possibility of severe injuries and/or loss of life, medium-term operational interruption with limited or temporary reputational damage.

#### High (H)

Based on threat analysis and intelligence, the probability of an incident occurring in which the identified vulnerability may be exploited is likely. Similar incidents have occurred in the recent past, in the region, at similar facility types, or at a facility with a comparable vulnerability. If an incident were to take place, it might result in significant cost and/or damage in addition to the

possibility of severe injuries and/or loss of life, long-term operational interruption with long-term significant reputational damage.

#### Critical (C)

Based on threat analysis and intelligence, the probability of an incident occurring in which the identified vulnerability is exploited is highly likely. Similar incidents have frequently occurred in the recent past, in the region, at similar facility types, or at a facility with a comparable vulnerability. If an incident were to take place, very significant cost and/or damage may be incurred in addition to the possibility of severe injuries and/or significant loss of life, permanent operational interruption, danger to organizational stability with long-term significant reputational damage.

Recommendations prioritizing mitigation were assigned to each vulnerability identified. Prioritization factors are based on risk severity, the assessed threat, the potential impact on the facility and personnel, the estimated resources available, and the urgency to take remedial action:

#### Accept (Ac)

Identified risks have been evaluated as acceptable or tolerable. No further remedial actions are required at this time. Re-evaluation is required periodically, or in the case new information becomes available.

#### Transfer (Tr)

Risk should be transferred to a third party, including but not limited to an insurance provider, release, waiver, or official documentation.

#### Mitigate C (MC)

The identified vulnerability and associated risk should be re-evaluated periodically. Remediation should take place in the foreseeable future, when time and/or resources become available.

#### Mitigate B (MB)


The identified vulnerability and associated risk should be remediated as soon as time and/or resources become available.

### Mitigate A (MA)


The identified vulnerability and associated risk are of the highest priority and should be remediated immediately. Temporary solutions may be applied until the vulnerability and risk are sufficiently addressed.

RISK LEVEL	SECTION	AREA	VULNERABILITY	PRIORITY
Critical	Building	Emergency Exit	Rapid Egress Denial- Fire Hazard	Mitigate A
	Interior	Main Office	Emergency Locking Delay	Mitigate A
	Perimeter	Parking Lot	Insufficient Access Control	Mitigate A
	Building	Rear and Side Entrance Doors	Insufficient Access Control	Mitigate A
High	Building	Main Entrance	Insufficient Security Camera Coverage	Mitigate A
	Interior	Auditorium	Insufficient Emergency Signage	Mitigate A
	Personnel	Guard Services	Insufficient Medical Training	Mitigate A
	Perimeter	Building Frontage	Structural Weakness/Unprotected Glass	Mitigate B
	Perimeter	Perimeter Lights	Exposed to Tampering	Mitigate A
Medium	Building	Gas Main	Vehicular Impact	Mitigate B
	Equipment	Video Assessment and Surveillance System (CCTV)	Outdated Security Camera System	Mitigate B
	Procedures	Lock-Down Plan	Undesignated Cover and Concealment Areas	Mitigate A
	Perimeter	Utility Main	Insufficient Access Control	Mitigate B
Low	Building	Rear and Side Entrance Doors	Enables Surveillance	Accept
	Interior	Door	Inoperable Door	Mitigate C

## **Risk Severity by Section**



## **Section by Risk Severity**



Perimeter

Building


Interior

Equipment

Procedures

Personnel

## **Section by Mitigation Priority**



## **Perimeter**

## **Parking Lot**





### **Vulnerability: Insufficient Access Control**

Vehicle and/or pedestrian access to the parking lot is not controlled. Unauthorized vehicles may park illegally, observe, or gain access to the facility. In some cases, unrestricted access to a parking lot may expose the facility and/or personnel to the risk of accidental or deliberate vehicular impact.



#### **Solutions**

#### • Vehicle Spikes Installation

Subject to safety restrictions, install vehicle spikes at the parking lot exit points to prevent unauthorized vehicle entry.



#### Sticker/Permit Allocation

Issue permits to vetted vehicles for entry into the facility's parking lot. Each permit should be serialized, providing unique vehicle/driver identification. Issuing permits will also assist in expediting vetting procedures at the parking lot access point.

Reference: FEMA 459, 5-7

### **Building Frontage**



## Md

#### **Vulnerability: Structural Weakness/Unprotected Glass**

The material or design of the building frontage is not resilient and may be vulnerable to damage or intrusion. Materials such as unprotected glass and hollow wood increase the risk of potential intrusion, damage to the facility, or injury to personnel. In an explosion, lite materials such as glass and wood may be projected into the facility at high speed, resulting in injury or damage.



#### **Solutions**

#### Glass Protection Film

Treat the unprotected glass along the building frontage with shatter resistant, fragment retention, tinted and anchored protective security film. While the security film may limit glass fragmentation and delay an intrusion, the tinting will provide additional privacy screening so an aggressor cannot easily see inside the building.

Reference: FEMA 426, 1-35, 3-73

### **Perimeter Lights**






### **Vulnerability: Exposed to Tampering**

The exterior lighting fixtures are not tamper-resistant and/or installed within reach of ground personnel (below 12 to 14ft). Limited lighting may promote unlawful activity impacting personnel and facility assets. Additionally, inadequate lighting may render existing surveillance equipment ineffective.





#### **Solutions**

#### • Protective Enclosure

Surround the lighting fixture within a protective enclosure shielding the bulb from damage.

Reference: FEMA 428, F-8

## **Utility Main**





#### **Vulnerability: Insufficient Access Control**

The utility main is accessible to unauthorized personnel making the facility's critical infrastructure vulnerable to damage or tampering. Tampering with the utility main may put personnel at risk, cause damage to the facility, and disrupt facility operations.





#### **Solutions**

#### Welded Bar Cage Enclosure

Enclose the utility main in a solid protective cage to prevent tampering. Reference: FEMA 426, 3-89

#### Tamper-Evident Seal

Seal or lock the utility main. Ensure the applied safeguard provides an indication if removed or tampered with.

Reference: FEMA 426, 2-72

## **Building**

### **Emergency Exit**





### **Vulnerability: Rapid Egress Denial-Fire Hazard**

The emergency exit door/gate may violate fire code, potentially restricting or delaying emergency egress of facility occupants. A malfunctioning lock, improperly installed locking device or blocked route may result in delayed and disorderly evacuation in case of an emergency.





#### **Solutions**

#### • Egress Pathway Clearance

Ensure the area leading to and around the emergency exit is clear of debris and clutter to facilitate quick evacuation in case of an emergency.

Reference: NYPD Engineering Security Protective Design for High Risk Buildings, Pg. 62

#### **Gas Main**





### **Vulnerability: Vehicular Impact**

The gas main is vulnerable to vehicular impact. An accidental or intentional collision may result in structural damage or injury to personnel.



#### **Solutions**

#### • Bollard Installation

Install bollards to protect the gas main and primary piping. Bollard size and depth should typically not exceed 30 inches in height. Bollard spacing should be between 36 to 48 inches (0.9 and 1.2 meters).

Reference: FEMA 426, 1-41, 2-20, 2-37, 2-42

#### Natural Barriers

Emplace or reinforce natural barriers around the gas main. Natural obstacles can be aesthetically pleasing while serving as vehicular barrier solutions. Examples include street furniture, sculptures, landscaping, decorative walls, and fences, all which serve as viable solutions mitigating vehicular impact effects.

Reference: FEMA 426, 2-20, 2-42



#### **Rear and Side Entrance Doors**





### **Vulnerability: Enables Surveillance**

The entrance door permits outside observation into the facility. Surveillance enables an aggressor to collect information on security procedures, occupants, general activities and areas of vulnerability which may aid in the planning and execution of an unlawful act.



#### **Solutions**

#### Privacy Screening

On the entrance door, install opaque or semi-opaque privacy screening such as window tinting film, window frosting, pull-down shades, curtains or fabric to prevent the observation of critical assets by persons outside the facility.

Reference: FEMA 426, F-8





### **Vulnerability: Insufficient Access Control**

The facility entrance door lacks sufficient access control, enabling unauthorized entry from outside the facility.



#### **Solutions**

#### Professional Guard Deployment

Deploy professional guard service personnel by the entrance door to control access to the facility. Provide the guard with detailed written procedures, emergency protocols, and emergency contacts.

Reference: FEMA 426, 5-7, 5-19

#### Security Camera Installation

Install security camera/s around the entrance door to monitor and document activity in the area. Ensure camera placement facilitates clear observation of relevant areas and the ability to identify faces, vehicles, and/or license plates when applicable.

Reference: FEMA 426, 4-21, 5-44

#### **Main Entrance**





#### **Vulnerability: Insufficient Security Camera Coverage**

Activity around the main entrance door is not sufficiently monitored and/or documented by a security camera system. The ability to identify and screen personnel requesting access to the facility or respond to unlawful activity is limited and may be delayed, potentially exposing personnel and property to risk. Limited security cameras may encourage unlawful activity in unsupervised areas and hinder the ability to conduct a thorough post-incident investigation.



#### **Solutions**

#### Security Camera Installation

Install security camera/s to monitor activity around the main entrance door. Sufficient security camera coverage may substitute the need for frequent patrols in the area. Ensure camera placement facilitates the identification of all individuals entering or exiting the doorway. The camera type/model installed should function in all lighting and weather conditions, day and night. For increased deterrence, install cameras in overt locations, strategically placed to avoid vandalism, sabotage, or environmental damage. Motion sensors may also be used to detect movement in vulnerable areas and prioritize monitoring.

Reference: FEMA 426, 4-21, 5-44, NYPD Engineering Security Protective Design for High Risk Buildings, Pg. 54

## **Interior**

#### **Auditorium**





#### **Vulnerability: Insufficient Emergency Signage**

Emergency signage within the auditorium is insufficient and may significantly delay an evacuation during an emergency. Occupants may be unable to find safety equipment and navigate safely to the nearest exit or safe haven.



#### **Solutions**

#### Signage Repair/Replace

Repair/replace emergency signage and ensure it is properly displayed and illuminated.





#### Illuminated Emergency Exit Signs

Install glow in the dark or illuminated emergency exit signs in the auditorium. Ensure signs are maintained and function under normal and emergency power conditions. Additionally, floor proximity signs are sometimes required as they direct occupants to the nearest exit, in the event they need to crawl due to heat, smoke, or debris.

Reference: FEMA 428, F-18

### **Main Office**





#### **Vulnerability: Emergency Locking Delay**

In an emergency, the main office cannot be quickly locked from the inside. An insufficient or missing locking device may delay or prevent office personnel from effectively locking down the room and utilizing it as a safe-haven, exposing occupants to related risk.





#### **Solutions**

Interior Lock/Bolt

Subject to fire code restrictions, install a lock or bolt-lock on the interior of the main office door. In an emergency, locking the door from the inside is the fastest and most effective way to establish a safe-haven.

#### Door





### **Vulnerability: Inoperable Door**

The door does not function properly. A malfunctioning entryway may hinder evacuation and lockdown efforts, enable unauthorized access to the interior, and expose personnel and facility assets to associated threats.





#### **Solutions**

#### • Door Repair/Replacement

Repair or replace the door ensuring it serve as a sufficient barrier against unauthorized entry attempts. Keep the door closed and locked while maintaining egress functionality and the capability to alert staff if breached or left ajar.

Reference: FEMA 459, 5-5

## **Equipment**

## **Video Assessment and Surveillance System (CCTV)**





### **Vulnerability: Outdated Security Camera System**

The existing video assessment and surveillance system is outdated. The cameras render poor image quality, may not be IP accessible and have limited sensory and analysis capability. Although functional, the current system does not meet modern technological standards and offers limited surveillance capability. The use of outdated equipment provides a false sense of security and may require additional resources to ensure minimum security standards are met.





#### **Solutions**

#### • Security Camera System Upgrade

Upgrade the facility's existing video surveillance system. Install surveillance cameras along the facility's perimeter, around access points, intakes and in areas where vehicles or pedestrians may approach the facility undetected. Ensure cameras are also installed to monitor activity indoors and in common areas. For maximum effectiveness, cameras should be monitored continuously and in real-time. Install most cameras in overt areas to maximize deterrence. Place cameras in locations with a sufficient view of the desired area where they are not vulnerable to vandalism, sabotage, or environmental damage. Ensure the new system is IP or network accessible. The installation of IP-based electronic security systems can be installed independently of major facility renovations.

Reference: FEMA 459, 5.10

## **Procedures**

#### Lock-Down Plan





### **Vulnerability: Undesignated Cover and Concealment Areas**

The current facility lock-down plan does not define or designate cover and concealment areas within each safe room/haven. In the case of a lock-down situation, unestablished or inaccessible cover and concealment locations may prompt occupants to seek refuge in unsuitable areas.

#### **Solutions**

#### Defined Cover and Concealment Area

Designate and define optimal cover and/or concealment locations within each safe room/haven for occupant consideration in case of a lockdown. Designated cover

and concealment areas within each secure room should be clearly identified and marked to ensure a quick and effective response during an emergency. Facility users should be aware of what differentiates cover and concealment as it directly impacts protection levels in the case of a lock-down.

### **Personnel**

#### **Guard Services**





#### **Vulnerability: Insufficient Medical Training**

Facility security guards' medical/first-aid training and/or certifications are not current. CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) and first aid education require refresher training and routine practice in order to maintain qualifications. Insufficient knowledge of these life-saving techniques may delay the rendering of aid and decrease survivability odds.

#### **Solutions**

#### • CPR/First Aid Training

Ensure facility security personnel complete medical/first aid training in order to obtain the relevant certification. CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) and first aid training provide staff with the skills required to provide life-saving assistance in response to medical emergencies. Ensure training includes the use of an AED (Automated external defibrillator) when applicable.

# **General Remarks**

## **GRG Mapping**



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